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The economy
Abstract
The rapid expansion and diversifi cation of the economy in the twentieth century brought immense wealth
and many new opportunities to many Australians. Real per capita income grew nearly sixfold in the century
following Federation. When the first federal parliament met on 9 May 1901, Australia was still suffering the
effects of the 1890s downturn, and it would wait another seven years until average incomes returned to their
pre-Depression peak of 1891. The following four decades were marked by the uncertainty surrounding two
world wars and an inter-war Depression. Higher levels of real income began to be achieved by the mid-1930s
but it was not until the second half of the century that incomes rose sharply over a long period that was briefly
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The rapid expansion and diversification of the economy in the twentieth century brought 
immense wealth and many new opportunities to many Australians. Real per capita 
income grew nearly sixfold in the century following Federation. When the first federal 
parliament met on 9 May 1901, Australia was still suffering the effects of the 1890s 
downturn, and it would wait another seven years until average incomes returned to their 
pre-Depression peak of 1891. The following four decades were marked by the uncertainty 
surrounding two world wars and an inter-war Depression. Higher levels of real income 
began to be achieved by the mid-1930s but it was not until the second half of the century 
that incomes rose sharply over a long period that was briefly interrupted by the minor 
recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s. (See Figure 16.1.)1 
                                                          
1 Australian GDP estimates are contested terrain. The original aggregations of N.G. Butlin (Australian 
Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861–1938/39, Cambridge University Press, 
1962) to World War 2 have been modified and updated especially by Matthew W. Butlin (‘A 
Preliminary Annual Database 1900/01 to 1973/74’, Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of 
Australia, May 1977) and Ian W. McLean and Jonathan J. Pincus (‘Living Standards in Australia 
1890–1940: Evidence and Conjectures’, Working Papers in Economic History, no. 6 (Canberra: 
Department of Economic History, ANU, 1982). Bryan Haig (‘New Estimates of Australian GDP: 1861–
1948/49’, Australian Economic History Review, 41, 1 (2001): 1–34) contests N.G. Butlin’s figures. 
Angus Maddison (The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris: OECD, 2003) drew extensively on 
Butlin but chose Haig’s revised data for 1911–12 to 1938–39. Leandro Prados de la Escosura 
(‘International Comparisons of Real Product, 1820–1990’, Explorations in Economic History, 37 
(2000): 1–41) criticises Maddison’s use of a recent constant prices base year, but the latter receives 
support from Stephen Broadberry and Douglas A. Irwin (‘Lost Exceptionalism? Comparative Income 
and Productivity in Australia and the UK, 1861–1948’, Economic Record, 83, 262 (2005): 262–74). 




Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) – Angus Maddison 
Homepage, ‘Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD’, table 3 
<http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm>, accessed 1 April 2012 . Constant prices 
in 1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars.  
Accompanying substantial improvements in wealth were advances in wellbeing more 
broadly. Working conditions for many employees improved, partly as a result of 
industrial restructuring and innovation, but also because of greater attention to health and 
safety practices that were codified into statutes in most States by the 1970s. Across the 
twentieth century, the length of time that employees were required to spend at the 
workplace was also reduced with the shortening of the working day, working week and 
even working life.2 Households benefitted from a widening range of new consumer 
durables, which removed much of the physical labour and reduced the time of many daily 
                                                          
2 Ian McLean, ‘Economic Wellbeing’, in Rodney Maddock and Ian W. McLean (eds), The Australian Economy in 
the Long Run (Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 321–7; Michael Carter and Rodney Maddock, ‘Leisure 



















Figure 1. Australian Real Gross Domestic 
Product per capita, 1901-2000 
chores.3 People thus had more spare time to spend outside the working day, which 
spurred much greater consumption of leisure services such as professional sport, theatre 
and cinema.4 
More time and more money generated a third improvement in wellbeing: greater 
choice. Higher incomes achieved through shorter hours of work put individuals and 
households in a position where they could choose between work and leisure, knowing 
that a preference for more of the latter would not risk putting them below the poverty line. 
There is some evidence to suggest that leisure preferences were stronger in the first half 
of the century, especially among men, than in the second, although part-time work has 
become more common in recent decades.5 The growth of branding and mass retailing 
meant Australians could make more choices as consumers as well as producers.6 
Improvements in choice have been particularly important for women, whose role in the 
economy has diversified from primarily household managers to increased participation in 
the workforce and higher education.7 Indeed, some of the apparent improvement in 
wealth represented by rising gross domestic product (GDP) reflects women entering the 
workforce and hiring professional services for help with domestic tasks that were 
formerly part of the non-monetised household economy. In a similar fashion, the 
professionalisation of sport commercialised formerly amateur activities. Underpinning 
these improvements was a significant increase in average life expectancy, which enabled 
higher levels of income, leisure time and choice to be enjoyed over a longer period. 
Between 1901–10 and 2004–06 male and female life expectancy at birth increased by 42 
and 43 per cent respectively, from 55 to 78 and 58 to 83 respectively.8 
                                                          
3 Tony Dingle, ‘Electrifying the Kitchen in Interwar Victoria’, Journal of Australian Studies, 22 (1988): 119–27. 
4 Richard Cashman, Paradise of Sport: A History of Australian Sport (Sydney: Walla Walla Press, 2010); Wray 
Vamplew and Brian Stoddart (eds), Sport in Australia: A Social History (Cambridge University Press, 1994); 
John Tulloch, Australian Cinema: Industry, Narrative and Meaning (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982). 
5 Carter and Maddock, ‘Leisure and Wellbeing, 1911–81’; Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Work’, in Measures of 
Australia’s Progress, 2010, cat. no. 1370.0 (Canberra: ABS, 2010). 
6 Greg Whitwell, Making the Market: The Rise of Consumer Society (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1989). 
7 Alison L. Booth and Hiau Joo Kee, ‘A Long Run View of the University Gender Gap in Australia’, Australian 
Economic History Review, 51, 3 (2011): 254–76; Glen Withers, Anthony M. Endres and Len Perry, ‘Labour’, 
in Wray Vamplew (ed.), Australians: Historical Statistics (Sydney: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, 
1987), p. 145. 
8 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, March 2011, cat. no. 4102.0 (Canberra: ABS, 2011). 
Modern comparative measurements of national wellbeing rank Australia highly. The 
United Nations Human Development Index has been calculated annually among about 
180 nations since 1990 and is based on longevity, knowledge and standard of living. It 
has consistently ranked Australia among the top few nations.9 The Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s quality of urban life indicator regularly ranks Australian cities very highly.10 
Finally, Australia has fared well in international surveys of happiness conducted since the 
1940s.11 
Australia’s story since Federation is ostensibly a process of rapid, transformational 
economic modernisation, but the narrative is a complex and often dichotomous one. 
Figure 16.1 shows that much of the income growth occurred in the second half of the 
century, which was less affected by major disruptive events. However, the inclusion of a 
broader wellbeing spectrum tempers this story – much of the reduction in working hours, 
the introduction of household innovations, and increases in life expectancy occurred in 
the first half of the century. The inter-war Depression, for example, belies the expansion 
in consumer industries and services, while World War 2 motivated advances in the 
organisation and technology of manufacturing in Australia, as it did elsewhere. Finally, 
the impact of improved nutrition on living standards is suggested through anthropometric 
studies showing rising heights among army recruits when comparing the two world 
wars.12 
Everyone did not share equally in this enhanced wellbeing. Income, and particularly 
wealth, continued to be unevenly distributed, although progressive taxation regimes and 
the growing social wage associated with public provision of services appear to have 
helped to narrow the income gap. The historical evidence to measure inequality is limited 
by few data points and differing forms of measurement over time. The conclusions of 
different writers are not always consistent but point to a secular decline in inequality 
                                                          
9 United Nations Human Programme (UNDP), ‘Human Development Index (HDI)’ 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>, accessed 21 October 2011. 
10 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Liveability Ranking Report August 2011’ 
<https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=liveabilityAug2011>, accessed 21 October 
2011. 
11 Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, ‘Happiness and the Human Development Index: Australia Is Not a Paradox’, 
Australian Economic Review, 39, 2 (2006): 176–84. 
12 Greg Whitwell and Stephen Nicholas, ‘Weight and Welfare of Australians, 1890–1940’, Australian Economic 
History Review, 41, 2 (2001): 59–75. 
between the 1930s and 1970s.13 Anthony Atkinson and Andrew Leigh’s study of the 
income share of the wealthiest 10 per cent broadly confirms these trends. They also find 
that in the final two decades of the century inequality appears to have risen slightly due to 
lower top marginal tax rates, skill-based technological change and shifting attitudes to 
inequality.14 
Notable for their absence, however, are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
who appear not to have shared substantially in most of the improvements in both income 
and wellbeing. Indeed, it was not until after the 1967 constitutional amendment that 
serious attempts were made to collect widespread information about the Indigenous 
population. The census of 1971 confirmed Indigenous people had been left behind on 
most wellbeing indicators. Analysis of census returns over the following 30 years has 
revealed evidence of a slow process of ‘closing the gap’ on most key indicators, 
significantly in unemployment rates, school attendance and post-school qualifications.15 
Finally, in spite of the rapid advances of the last 100 years, Australia’s relative 
economic standing internationally has declined for most of the century. In the middle of 
the nineteenth century, Australia, along with New Zealand, had the highest per capita 
income in the world. By the 1920s it had been matched or surpassed by New Zealand, the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.16 This ‘lost exceptionalism’ has been 
widely debated among economic historians who seek to understand whether this was 
merely an expected adjustment as the small population denominator grew rapidly or if 
Australian competitiveness was in decline.17 However, there has been some reversal since 
the early 1990s with Australia’s per capita GDP growing more quickly than the 
                                                          
13 Ian McLean, ‘Economic Wellbeing’, pp. 331–5. 
14 Anthony B. Atkinson and Andrew Leigh, ‘The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia’, Economic Record, 83, 
262 (2007): 247–61. 
15 Jon C. Altman, Nicholas Biddle and Boyd H. Hunter, ‘A Historical Perspective on Indigenous Socio-Economic 
Outcomes in Australia, 1971–2001’, Australian Economic History Review, 45, 3 (2005): 273–95. 
16 Ian McLean, ‘Australian Economic Growth in Historical Perspective’, Economic Record, 80, 250 (2004): 332, 
table 1b. 
17 Stephen Broadberry and Douglas A. Irwin, ‘Lost Exceptionalism? Comparative Income and Productivity in 
Australia and the UK, 1861–1948’, Economic Record, 83, 262 (2007): 262–74; Bryan Haig, ‘Real Product and 
Productivity of Industries since the Nineteenth Century: A Comment on “Lost Exceptionalism” by Broadberry 
and Irwin’, Economic Record, 84, 267 (2008): 511–14. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average.18 Table 
16.1 compares Australia’s twentieth-century growth performance with some key 
advanced industrial or resource-based economies. It shows a mixed picture, with 
Australian incomes growing more quickly than the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Argentina but more slowly than the United States, Canada and Norway. 
Table 16.1. Index of comparative real gross domestic product per capita, 1901–2000 
Year Argentina New Zealand UK Australia USA Canada Norway 
1901 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1913 132 122 111 134 119 144 129 
1929 152 125 124 137 155 164 178 
1938 141 153 141 153 137 147 224 
1950 173 200 156 193 214 235 286 
1973 277 294 270 336 374 447 595 
1991 242 316 363 442 512 590 1,001 
2000 298 385 457 566 638 726 1,320 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) – Angus Maddison Homepage, ‘Statistics 
on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD’, table 3 
<http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm>, accessed 1 April 2012. Based on constant prices in 
1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars.  
The debate is of broader significance because understanding the country’s role in the 
international or global economy is rightly a key concern of Australian economists and 
economic historians. Australia’s characterisation as a highly internationalised economy is 
confirmed by figures that measure international trade’s share of GDP, the migrant 
proportion of the population and the magnitude of foreign investment.19 Exponents of 
staple theory have emphasised the importance of export-led growth through the foreign 
earnings from key commodities, while the consequences of protection for the Australian 
economy have generated equal discussion. Among recent major contributions to 
Australian economic history, David Meredith and Barry Dyster used Australia’s role in 
                                                          
18 Charles Bean, ‘The Australian Economic “Miracle”: A View from the North’, in David Gruen and Sona 
Shrestha (eds), The Australian Economy in the 1990s (Canberra: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2000), p. 74. 
19 Ian McLean, ‘Growth in a Small Open Economy: An Historical View’, in Bruce Chapman (ed.), Australian 
Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Fred H. Gruen (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989), p. 16, table 1.2. 
the international economy as the organising framework for their textbook.20 More 
specifically, Ian McLean has referred to the ‘synchronous behaviour’ that has linked 
vicissitudes in Australia’s economic performance to events in the international 
economy.21 Thus the inter-war Depression, the post–World War 2 boom, the recessions 
of the early 1980s and 1990s, and the boom that followed into the new century were all 
global economic trends. As a small player, Australia has been largely beholden to trends 
in the global economy as a receiver rather than a transmitter of economic linkages. Of 
importance in this relationship are both the direct economic linkages through factor and 
product markets such as the international flows of labour, capital and technology, and 
linkages through public policy in response to conditions in the increasingly global 
economy. The geographic locus of those linkages has moved over time. 
The shifting focus of economic and business activity 
Economic expansion involved changing patterns of economic activity geographically, 
organisationally and across sectors. At a broad sectoral level, manufacturing’s share of 
economic activity progressed in the form of an inverted ‘U’ shape, rising through the first 
half of the century but thereafter falling by 2000 to a share similar to that at Federation. 
The resource industries, despite cyclical volatility associated with overseas demand, 
generally lost share of GDP but continued to dominate exports. The diverse and under-
recorded services sector held the largest broad share at the beginning of the century and 
continued to increase its dominance as the century progressed. This increase was due in 
part to the growth of specialist firms providing services previously hidden within 
vertically integrated corporations.22 While different measures of economic activity, such 
as output, employment and capital formation, provide some variations in the magnitude 
and timing of these trends, the overall conclusions remain the same. As one might expect, 
the services and manufacturing sectors have dominated employment, while most farms 
and mines have been more land and capital-intensive. 
This pattern of structural change is consistent with generalisations of the way 
economies develop: that is, a shift occurs from primary to secondary industry as 
                                                          
20 David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and Change (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
21 McLean, ‘Growth in a Small Open Economy’, pp. 7–10; Ian W. McLean, Why Australia Prospered: The 
Shifting Sources of Economic Growth (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 18–19, 100–1. 
22 Michael Carter, ‘Services’, in Maddock and McLean (eds), The Australian Economy in the Long Run, pp. 222–
3. 
economies industrialise, with the latter in turn yielding ground to services in the post-
industrial age. It also broadly approximates the distribution of economic activity across 
the twentieth century in other developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Canada.23 
The contribution of the sectors to international trade, however, sets Australia apart 
from many economically developed nations. Resource exports have remained dominant 
(about 75–95 per cent of visible exports), far exceeding the sector’s diminishing share of 
GDP (about 10–25 per cent) and helping to pay for negative balances from manufacturing 
imports.24 At its mid-century peak, manufacturing’s approximately 30 per cent share of 
GDP was similar to many industrialised nations but its share of exports remained much 
lower.25 The non-tradable nature of many services meant that their contribution to the 
international sector was much less than to the domestic economy. Exceptionally, 
education services expanded rapidly in the final two decades of the century to become the 
biggest export earner after coal and iron ore as large numbers of foreign students studied 
in Australia. Australia is thus part of a small group of developed resource-based 
economies that include Norway, New Zealand and Canada. 
The broad sectoral trends conceal significant innovation and change at a higher level 
of disaggregation, which has generally been more difficult to measure with precision. 
Within manufacturing, individual industries and their products rose and fell in response to 
innovation, the entrance of foreign multinationals, changing consumer tastes, and trade 
policy. In the early years of the century, manufacturing was clustered in bulky, low-value 
goods that used basic technology, such as in building materials, clothing and primary 
metals – though some continuous process, mass-production technology was emerging in 
food processing industries such as milling, brewing and distilling. Manufacturing’s 
expansion after 1918 was broadly based, drawing on traditional industries such as foods 
and textiles, and emergent sectors, particularly electrical equipment and vehicle 
construction and use. The disruption to sea trade during World War 2 provided the 
opportunity to expand through import substitution into sectors such as machine tools, in 
                                                          
23 Ibid., pp. 198–200. 
24 John W. Freebairn, ‘Natural Resource Industries’, in Maddock and McLean (eds), The Australian Economy in 
the Long Run, p. 160; Ian McLean, ‘Why Was Australia So Rich?’, Explorations in Economic History, 44, 4 
(2007): 635–56. 
25 Kym Anderson, ‘Tariffs and the Manufacturing Sector’, in Maddock and McLean (eds), The Australian 
Economy in the Long Run, pp. 166–9. 
which producers had previously been uncompetitive compared with large-scale foreign 
enterprises. 
In the 1950s and 1960s industrial expansion was viewed as the path to further 
economic development in Australia, which fostered increases in protection through 
quotas and local content requirements to support import substitution in particular 
industries. Symptomatic of this were the government incentives in favour of local 
production of engines and chassis that motivated the first entirely Australian-built car in 
1948 by Holden.26 By the end of the 1960s, manufacturing’s share of GDP had begun to 
decline. Tariff policy played a complex role: on the one hand, the shelter provided by 
persistently high tariff levels, peaking in the 1970s, weakened underlying international 
competitiveness; on the other, subsequent tariff reductions pushed domestic producers out 
of business. Other factors included the emergence of new industrial nations in Southeast 
Asia with lower labour costs, while the rising global scale of manufacturing made it 
difficult for a nation with a small labour force and market to build international 
competitiveness in many industries.27 By the final decades of the twentieth century, a 
smaller but technologically more sophisticated manufacturing sector found a competitive 
niche in sub-industry sectors such as vehicle components. As a result, manufacturing 
raised its share of merchandise exports, particularly elaborately transformed products that 
have gone through several manufacturing stages.28 
The resources sector diversified similarly. The nineteenth-century staples of wool, 
wheat, coal and gold yielded share to the exploitation of a widening range of resources 
including refrigerated food products, oil, gas, uranium, iron ore, bauxite, alumina, nickel, 
manganese, fertilisers and fish farming. These advances drew upon high levels of 
technological innovation brought about by interaction between the resources sector and 
enabling institutions such as universities, government research institutes and the capital 
goods industries. This ability to develop new resource industries and products on a 
                                                          
26 Robert Conlon and John Perkins, Wheels and Deals: The Automobile Industry in Twentieth-Century Australia 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 115–23. 
27 Colin Forster, ‘Economies of Scale and Australian Manufacturing’, in Colin Forster (ed.), Australian Economic 
Development in the Twentieth Century (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), pp. 123–68. 
28 David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press), pp. 
12–13. 
regular basis goes a long way to explaining why Australia dodged the so-called resource 
curse that causally links resource intensity to retarded economic growth.29 
The pattern of development across the twentieth century confirms the notorious 
cyclical instability of resource industries, dependent both upon the vagaries of nature for 
production and the whims of industrialising nations for demand. The heavy reliance on 
resource exports consequently led to significant vicissitudes in the terms of trade across 
the century.30 Agricultural and pastoral output was enduring the tail end of the drought 
and economic crises of the 1890s at the time of Federation. The two world wars brought 
boom conditions for Australia’s pastoral industries due to the British government’s 
acquisition of Australian wool at generous official prices. Curtailment of overseas 
demand between the wars adversely affected Australia’s resources industries. In the 
1950s and 1960s, innovation, further wars in Korea and Vietnam, and Japanese 
industrialisation contributed to a restoration of healthy conditions and a spike in the terms 
of trade. The 1970s and much of the 1980s witnessed a return to difficult international 
trading conditions. More recently, the secular boom of the 1990s and the industrialisation 
of China have provided enormous opportunities for Australian miners. 
The services omnibus includes business, personal, leisure and public services. The 
mix within each of these subsets varied across the century. Business activities, originally 
designed to support the supply chain of primary industries, such as finance, auctioneering 
and shipping, broadened with the economy to include more accounting, law, 
communications, property and consultancy or advice activities. Leisure services grew, 
aided by shorter working hours. Wholesale and retail services remained relatively 
important but with some major changes in form, particularly the growth of mass retailing 
through department and chain stores. Public services grew with the expanding role of 
government in health, education and defence. 
Transport services, vital for an expansive and distant nation like Australia, were 
transformed by new technologies. Land-based public transport yielded ground to the 
family car by the 1950s, while the rising provision and falling cost of air travel 
overwhelmed shipboard passenger travel from the 1960s, although seaborne freight 
                                                          
29 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review, 45, 
4–6 (2001): 827–38. 
30 Meredith and Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn, pp. 65, 103, 183, 227, 254, 320. 
remains the dominant mode of conveyance.31 Within the household budget, new 
technologies led to shifts in service provision – whitegoods replacing domestic service 
from the interwar period, live theatre and music giving way following World War 2 to 
‘entertainment systems’ and, more recently, computers. Ironically, the effect in each case 
has been to increase the demand for manufactured goods that use the general-purpose 
technologies of electricity, the internal combustion engine and the microchip. 
In spite of Federation, Australia remained firmly within the sphere of British 
economic influence for several decades as Australia’s principal trade, investment and 
migration partner. Up to World War 1, 44–47 per cent of Australian exports went to 
Britain, from where Australia received 53–61 per cent of its imports. This reflected the 
complementary relations between a merchandise and a commodity-based economy, so 
that Australia exchanged wool and wheat for British manufactures.32 By 1914, 44 per 
cent of Australia’s long-term stock of international capital had come from the United 
Kingdom.33 Finally, nearly 80 per cent of immigrants arriving in Australia on the eve of 
World War 1 came from the United Kingdom and Ireland.34 Australia’s subservience to 
the needs of the British Empire was apparent in other ways – it was part of the ‘sterling 
bloc’ of countries that was established following devaluation of the pound in 1931, all of 
which linked their currency to that of Britain, kept their gold reserves in London, and 
participated in the 1932 Ottawa Agreement of an ‘imperial preference’ customs union. 
Yet Australia gradually broke away from British mediation of its international 
economic relations to build trade and investment with most major economies, including 
the USA, Canada, Japan, China and the principal Western European countries. 
Reorientation occurred in several phases. By the inter-war years the USA was increasing 
its share of Australian exports and imports, a trend that continued through to the 1960s. 
By then, though, Australia’s export market had begun to shift again – towards Japan, 
whose steel mills became eager consumers of Australian coal and iron ore as a result of 
                                                          
31 Graeme Davison, Car Wars: How the Car Won Our Hearts and Conquered Our Cities (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2004); Jim Davidson and Peter Spearritt, Holiday Business: Tourism in Australia since 1870 
(Melbourne University Press, 2000), ch. 10. 
32 Meredith and Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn, p. 68, table 3.1. 
33 Ibid., p. 45, table 2.2. 
34 David Pope and Glenn Withers, ‘Wage Effects of Immigration in Late Nineteenth Century Australia’, in 
Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds), Migration and the International Labour Market, 1850–
1939 (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 242. 
that nation’s rapid industrialisation. Similarly, China had become the principal destination 
of Australian exports by the 1990s.35 
These trading shifts were mirrored relatively closely by investment, particularly with 
the arrival of large numbers of American manufacturing multinationals into Australia 
from the 1920s including Ford (1925), General Motors (1926) and Monsanto (1928), 
followed in turn by Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi (1926), Toyota (1958) and 
Sumitomo (1961). American and Japanese firms transferred skills, technology and 
organisational thinking that were vital to the modernising Australian economy. By the 
1980s there were major investment flows in the opposite direction as Australian firms 
engaged in resources, services and manufacturing expanded overseas, particularly in 
Europe and the United States but also to smaller affiliates in New Zealand and Asia.36 
Australia’s outward stock of foreign direct investment increased in nominal terms from 
$2 billion to $117 billion between 1980 and 2003; as a share of GDP, this was a 
remarkable rise from less than 2 per cent to 23 per cent.37 
Within Australia, the key geographic shifts in economic activity were associated with 
rising levels of urbanisation. The urban share of population rose from 49 to 86 per cent 
between 1901 and 1981 before declining slightly in the following two decades.38 Sydney 
and Melbourne consolidated their leadership as the principal economic and demographic 
conurbations. This trend, related largely to rising manufacturing output and the growing 
services sector, motivated heavy investment in urban utilities such as water, gas, 
electricity and sewerage. While the rural sector’s share of output gave up some ground, 
the relocation of the international wool market from London to the Australian port cities 
required substantial new investments in sale rooms, display and storage warehouses to 
                                                          
35 Meredith and Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy, 2nd edn, p. 192, table 8.4; Kym Anderson, ‘Australia in 
the International Economy’, in John Nieuwenhuysen, Peter Lloyd and Margaret Mead (eds), Reshaping 
Australia’s Economy: Growth with Equity and Sustainability (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 38–9. 
36 David Merrett, ‘Australian Multinationals in Historical Perspective: “Do You Come from a Land Down 
Under?”’, in Howard Dick and David Merrett (eds), The Internationalisation Strategies of Small Country 
Firms: The Australian Experience of Globalisation (Cheltenham: Elgar), pp. 26–7. 
37 Ibid., p. 25, table 2.3. 
38 J.C. Caldwell, ‘Population’, in Vamplew (ed.), Australians, p. 40; Graeme Hugo, ‘A Century of Population 
Change’, in Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia, 2001, cat. no. 1301.0 (Canberra: ABS, 2001). 
support the new auction system.39 Many foreign buyers from Europe and Japan set up 
offices in Sydney and Melbourne to be close to the market. Sydney and Melbourne’s 
growing domination of urban manufacturing and services reflected an increasing regional 
specialisation in economic activity as Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland 
developed their resource-based industries, particularly mining, timber and agriculture. 
Big business, both Australian and foreign-owned, became an essential part of the 
landscape of the Australian economy in the twentieth century. Initially, the largest 
enterprises were government-owned, a consequence of public responsibility for major 
forms of infrastructure such as railways and postal communications originating in the 
colonial socialism of the late nineteenth century. The Victorian Railways and New South 
Wales Railways managed the largest portfolios of capital and labour before 1914. Some 
utility industries, such as electricity, came under government ownership from the 1920s 
and a further, though temporary, phase of public ownership occurred after World War 2. 
However, the predominant feature of the emergent business economy was the rise of 
large-scale corporations reaching out across a national landscape. Multinationals flocked 
to Australia, attracted by the growing local consumer market and the need to jump tariff 
barriers. Domestic firms responded to similar impulses and were able to seek funding 
from the emerging local capital market as new issues became easier to raise and more 
firms were regularly traded on the state-based stock exchanges. As was the case in other 
nations, the largest firms tended to cluster in the expanding manufacturing sector, 
although diversifying resource firms provided an additional dimension to corporate 
expansion in Australia: for example, the miner Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) began steel 
production in Newcastle (1915) and Port Kembla (1935), while the Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company (CSR) diversified into building materials, beginning with vinyl 
flooring (1949) and hardboard (1959). Large-scale enterprise also moved increasingly 
into farming as the number of family farms halved to little more than 100,000 in the 
second half of the century, but their average size rose to meet scale imperatives and 
competition from corporate producers. 
While minnows compared with the leading firms of Britain or the United States, the 
largest firms were mammoths within Australia. For better or worse, they cast shadows 
                                                          
39 David Merrett, Stephen Morgan and Simon Ville, ‘Industry Associations as Facilitators of Social Capital: The 
Establishment and Early Operations of the Melbourne Wool Brokers Association’, Business History, 50, 6 
(2008): 781–94. 
over local business longer than those of their overseas counterparts.40 The quintessentially 
Australian term ‘big end of town’ intimates a group of collusive and self-seeking 
corporate leaders. In practice, however, these large firms drove cost-reducing scale 
efficiencies in production, served as receptacles for technical change and labour training, 
and achieved transaction cost economies through internalising many business 
transactions. The smallness of the domestic economy made it impossible for more than 
one or two firms in most industries to attain the scale to be internationally competitive. In 
most cases, looking to build scale through overseas expansion was problematic due to 
distance and an emphasis upon resource industries often unsuited to internationalisation. 
From about the 1980s, however, more Australian firms expanded abroad, motivated by a 
mix of country and firm-specific advantages, the increased competitiveness of Australian 
firms through domestic economic reform and the opportunity to exploit expanding 
overseas markets. This unfinished story remains one of limited achievement as firms 
across various sectors, including finance, banking, mining, communications, brewing and 
construction, pulled back investment by the end of the century. 
The economic benefits wrought by large-scale enterprise were entirely consistent 
with a culture of cooperation and collusion. As early as 1914 H.L. Wilkinson drew 
attention to the large number of trusts covering many sectors of the economy, including 
coal, tobacco, flour, fruit and shipping, many of which were colluding to raise prices or 
limit output.41 Despite the passage of the Australian Industries Preservation Act eight 
years earlier, partly to combat such practices, and Wilkinson’s desire to see government 
act decisively, collusion continued. By 1969 over 1,000 trade associations had been 
registered under the terms of the Trade Practices Act of 1965.42 Cooperation among firms 
also brought broader benefits, particularly through sharing know-how and capital 
equipment, a significant consideration for a small and distant economy, as the federal 
government came to recognise by the 1990s.43 
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The largest corporations at Federation were typically both owned and managed by the 
same small group of entrepreneurs, often family-based. By the final decades of the 
century Australia had belatedly followed the common pattern of modern corporate 
development of divorcing ownership from control with the expansion of small 
shareholders and large institutional investors. Foreign multinationals provided local 
exposure to best overseas practices in organisational structure and governance.44 There 
were also points of difference from the experience of other nations. The vast distance of 
the Australian continent presented challenges of coordination for service industries such 
as banking, pastoral agency, and retailing. This encouraged a form of ‘organic’ 
multidivisional organisation whereby the company leveraged its core competences in 
branches spread far and wide but ultimately relied upon a significant degree of autonomy 
at each location.45 That they chose their local staff carefully benefitted the largest firms, 
which could draw upon an internal labour market of known and trusted employees 
seeking to build their career within a single firm. 
Drivers of economic growth 
The sources of a nation’s economic growth and development can be examined at different 
levels. Increases in the scale of supply and demand will generate expanded economic 
activity. The sources of supply and demand, though, rarely remain unchanged: as was 
seen in the previous section, the patterns of activity altered as the Australian economy 
grew. Productivity, an increase in outputs relative to a given level of inputs, plays a key 
role in several respects. Higher levels of output can often be achieved more efficiently 
through economies of scale. New combinations of factor inputs, often the result of 
technical change, can also increase production efficiency. Innovations in one sector may 
spill over to the benefit of other parts of the economy through production linkages or 
shared learning environments. Economies are unlikely to achieve sustained expansion 
over time without productivity gains as well as increases in inputs. One study estimates 
that two-thirds of Australian economic growth from Federation to 1979 was attributable 
to factor accumulation and one-third to increased productivity.46 
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At a deeper level of analysis, why have some economies fared better than others at 
responding to the opportunities available in the international economy and in achieving 
growth-inducing productivity improvements? Comparative economic history has 
recorded much, but agreed little, on the critical set of growth-inducing conditions for an 
economy, debating the role of government policy, the natural environment, social-cultural 
relations and the influence of institutions. While this level of analysis of causality is more 
profound than estimates of factor accumulation and productivity change, it is far more 
difficult to reach universally accepted conclusions. The deeper determinants of economic 
development in Australia, as in any nation, are a complex and contested terrain. 
Australia’s population grew steadily through the twentieth century. While expanding 
more slowly than in the nineteenth century, Australia stood out among most developed 
countries for its rapid demographic expansion.47 Natural increase provided most of the 
overall growth in population, but immigration made an important contribution to the 
development of the workforce. Immigration’s share of population increase moved in a 
strongly pro-cyclical manner with economic fluctuations, suggesting its importance in 
filling labour market shortages in upturns while not increasing unemployment rates 
during downturns such as in the 1930s. Government policies of selective skill criteria, 
assisted passages and facilitated settlement all assisted the needs of the domestic labour 
market. Migration contributed as much as 45 per cent to the growth of the labour force in 
the post–World War 2 years when the manufacturing sector, with its heavy demand for 
labour, grew quickly.48 The gradual shift away from the white Australia policy provided a 
wider pool of foreign labour on which to draw. The earlier policy had been premised 
partly on the potential threat to the employment of domestic workers if large numbers of 
migrants had arrived from low-wage countries. David Pope and Glenn Withers have 
drawn attention to the contribution of migrants to aggregate demand as consumers, as 
well as being part of the workforce.49 
The labour force participation rate – the share of those aged between 15 and 64 
working or seeking work – has remained fairly steady since Federation at between about 
60 and 70 per cent, reflecting the economy’s ability to continually absorb new workers as 
the population expanded. This aggregate statistic conceals significant changes in 
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workforce composition, mainly since 1945, with the growth of female workers (especially 
married women), the reduced participation of older male workers, and the expansion of 
part-time and casual employment. Reflecting broader economic trends, much of this 
growth occurred in manufacturing and the large, labour-intensive service sector. 
Employment in farming stagnated while mining’s decline reflected the growing capital 
intensity of the sector. 
Increased labour productivity was achieved mostly by improvements in the human 
capital of the workforce, the effectiveness with which skills were assigned to relevant 
tasks, and changes in the organisation and technology of production. Literacy rates were 
already comparatively high in the late colonial period. The growth of secondary school 
participation rates and increases in per capita funding of education occurred largely in the 
decades after 1945. Technical training and tertiary education expanded most markedly in 
the final years of the century. This supports the view that factor accumulation rather than 
factor productivity growth predominated in Australia for much of the century and created 
a lag compared with nations such as the United States, which had already invested more 
heavily in human capital.50 
Internal labour markets, as receptacles of training and of appropriate career 
progression and task assignment, provided an alternative avenue for improved labour 
productivity. Several large organisations, including the Union Bank of Australia and 
Victorian Railways, operated internal labour markets by the beginning of the twentieth 
century, although these practices emerged more belatedly among other major firms.51 
American multinationals infused the latest thinking on the bureaucratic organisation of 
large-scale enterprise. From the late nineteenth century, American unidivisional (U-form) 
enterprises organised specialist career managers into functional departments (such as 
finance, marketing, research and production). From about the 1920s, multidivisional (M-
form) enterprises decentralised operations into product or geographic divisions that 
competed for the firm’s resources. Both structures derived primarily from the American 
corporate economy, which they served well in employee motivation and skill 
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specialisation.52 Hybrid forms were adopted in Australia, for example, by CSR, but 
generally not until after World War 2. Insufficient scale and the persistence of family 
ownership constrained earlier development. By the mid-1970s most leading Australian 
manufacturers had adopted the M-form.53 
Rapid increases in the capital stock similarly emphasised factor accumulation as a 
driver of Australian economic growth.54 Capital formation in the early decades extended 
the heavy investments in pastoralism, the railways and urban infrastructure, which had 
dominated expenditure prior to Federation. The railway network almost doubled in length 
from 20,240 kilometres in 1901 to 37,492 kilometres in 1921.55 By the inter-war period, 
manufacturing was a growing consumer of capital for the construction of factories and 
production of modern machinery. New technology, mostly from the United States and 
Europe, altered the nature of production. Innovation in both new and old industries relied 
upon the twin general-purpose technologies of electricity and automobiles to drive 
growth. Scale economies through mass-production methods reduced costs and enabled 
market leaders to emerge such as Tooth (brewing), Henry Jones (jam), Australian Glass 
Manufacturers, and Herald and Weekly Times (newspapers).56 Thus manufacturing was 
much better placed to contribute to the war effort in World War 2 and in turn received a 
greater boost than in World War 1, with substantial investments in new or existing 
factories by the Department of Munitions. 
The critical mass achieved by some corporate leaders enabled them to invest in 
intangible forms of marketing capital such as branding and advertising. This was 
particularly the case among firms in food and drinks products such as Carlton United 
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Brewery and Goodman Fielder. Henry Jones was using the IXL brand as early as the 
1890s to build market share and generate production scale economies. In the 1920s Bert 
Appleroth used a series of gimmicks and saturation advertising to promote ‘Aeroplane 
Jelly’, while Berlei focused on marketing women’s undergarments that were designed 
scientifically to fit more comfortably.57 In general, though, Australian firms were slow to 
develop brands compared with American or British ones.58 
The boom decades of the 1950s and 1960s raised investment levels in the public and 
private sectors. Businesses sought to overcome the paucity of wartime investment, catch 
up with overseas developments in the new consumer durable industries and fill the pent-
up demand for their products. Productivity surged ahead, driven by the expansion of 
innovative sectors in chemicals, metals and engineering – manufacturing output per 
employee grew at levels of above 4 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s compared with barely 
1 per cent in earlier decades.59 The suburbanisation of cities and the growth of vehicle 
ownership in turn motivated new public infrastructure investments in roads, utilities and 
telecommunications. The upshot of all this was that the ‘investment ratio’ of capital 
formation to GDP rose to the very high level of around 25 per cent.60 Although economic 
growth slowed after about 1970, investment remained high and shifted towards mining, 
and financial, business and property services. 
The growing services sector generated a series of productivity-enhancing innovations. 
From the 1960s a stream of advances in information technology benefitted business 
services by developing electronic systems for processing and storing data. This was 
clearly evident in the banking industry. At Westpac the milestones were electronic data 
storage from the 1960s and electronic processing from the 1970s, which facilitated 
automatic teller machines from 1980, electronic funds transfer from 1984, telephone 
banking from 1994 and internet banking from 1998.61 These changes improved labour 
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productivity and refocussed capital needs from the bricks and mortar of branches to 
modern information and communications technologies (ICT) systems. The 1990s were a 
tipping point for the uptake of ICT more generally: vast improvements in computer 
capabilities and the demand for them transformed price–performance ratios.62 Australians 
benefitted from this shift of the terms of trade in favour of user nations. Construction and 
wholesale and retail trade, as well as finance, became major users. Supply chains 
operated more efficiently through innovations such as electronic tagging, which enabled 
firms to reduce inventory holdings. 
Domestic personal savings emerged in the twentieth century as the principal source of 
investible funds for new capital formation as foreign investors responded warily to the 
economic turmoil of the 1890s and the local capital market began to take shape. 
Government banks, especially savings banks, filled the gap left by private trading banks 
and helped to mobilise individual savings. World War 1 brought further opportunities for 
individual savers through subscription to war loans.63 The State-based stock exchanges, 
formerly drawing largely upon mining stock, diversified into manufacturing. Aided by 
investment advice from stockbrokers such as J.B. Were, and the growth of a financial 
press, investors were enticed to purchase new issues in firms that promised to make the 
most of exciting, occasionally dubious, overseas innovations such as sound and motion 
pictures, vehicle components, optical and x-ray equipment, and cordial and aerated 
drinks. The number of securities traded on the Melbourne Stock Exchange rose from 149 
to 562 between 1907 and 1939, while the average number of shareholders in the thirteen 
largest companies across Australia rose from 1,029 in 1912 to 6,102 in 1954.64 The 
growing maturity of capital markets provided an effective response to the high post–
World War 2 investment ratio. Stock market listings grew and institutional investors 
(insurance companies and pension funds) exercised increasing influence, while 
privatisations attracted growing interest from small individual investors. The bond market 
matured considerably; issues became more regular, provided a more varied set of 
maturity dates and attracted an active secondary market.65 
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That the Australian economy was blessed with high rates of capital formation is 
unquestioned. Measuring the productivity of this capital is a lot more difficult, 
particularly the social overhead capital required in a rapidly developing economy for 
communications, urban utilities and housing. Railways are a case in point: they absorbed 
substantial volumes of investment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but 
there is little agreement on how best to assess productivity of the railways due to their 
indirect and lagged impacts on output.66 
An alternative approach is to ask whether the best choices were made between 
investment alternatives and how these decisions were reached. W.A. Sinclair drew 
attention to the weaknesses in public investment decision making due to inadequate 
appraisal of, and insufficient coordination between, projects.67 The contested opinions of 
policy makers at the time, and among historians more recently, have polarised into two 
schools of thought. The pursuit of urban-based manufacturing with the supporting 
infrastructure as the path to economic modernisation in most developed nations is set 
against the comparative advantages of primary industries based in rural communities as 
the traditional backbone and wealth generator of the developing Australian economy. 
Timothy Coghlan, government statistician for New South Wales, had warned as early as 
1904 that ‘the abnormal aggregation of the population into their capital cities is a most 
unfortunate element in the progress of these states’.68 This can be extended to include the 
idea that policy as a whole was slanted in favour of the cities due to their demographic 
and electoral dominance. Tariffs favoured urban manufacturing at the expense of rural 
exports and ‘tapered’ railway freight rates favoured large urban manufacturers at the 
expense of smaller rural firms in the same industries. Finally, the urban economic 
expansion was seen as crowding out factor markets, particularly through higher wages. 
In practice, there was greater balance since tariffs were offset by substantial rural 
industry assistance. By lowering average charges on longer hauls, tapered freight rates 
also helped rural exporters and fostered a pattern of regional specialisation within States. 
Capital markets were often segmented, with rural funds derived from specialist providers 
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such as stock and station agents and local banks, while urban infrastructure was typically 
funded by government bonds. At the heart of modern Australian economic development 
has been the synergistic relationship between rural production and urban services (such as 
finance, insurance, marketing and transport), both vital to export-led development. 
Land, as a factor of production, is often excluded from the modelling of developed 
economies on the grounds that it is insignificant to the manufacturing and services 
sectors. However, a broader notion of geography and environment is important to the 
development of all economies.69 The rural versus urban debate is an example of the 
influence of geography but there is far more to be said about its role in Australia. The 
most enduring thesis from this perspective is Geoffrey Blainey’s Tyranny of Distance, 
which emphasises the impact of Australia’s remote geographic location on the country’s 
pattern of economic development.70 The remoteness felt by settlers in the nineteenth 
century began to fade in the twentieth. Steam, then motorised shipping, together with the 
ocean cable, shortened and regularised external and internal communication times by the 
early twentieth century. Subsequent technological developments, including motor 
vehicles, air transport, telephones and information technology, brought down the cost and 
improved the ease and effectiveness of transport and communications to a degree that 
enabled Australians to mitigate many aspects of the tyranny of distance. At the same 
time, key economic activities were increasingly repatriated to Australia, including 
commodity markets, capital markets and corporations. Finally, the industrialisation of 
much of East Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, along with changing 
immigration patterns and cultural attitudes within Australia, brought the geography of the 
global economy much closer to Australian shores. 
Environmental challenges continued to shape the Australian economy in the twentieth 
century, including a harsh climate (inconsistent or low rainfall, temperature extremes) and 
geology (sparse river systems, semi-arid interior), which limited population settlement 
and agricultural expansion. These challenges were met with some carefully considered 
responses. Modern farming technology made better use of limited water supplies, while 
financial innovations helped to spread the risk between years of dearth and plenty. Our 
understanding of the role of the natural environment should also be appreciated through 
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its munificence: the natural resource industries have continued to occupy a central place 
in Australian prosperity and development in the twentieth century. 
Underpinning Australia’s continued progress were the institutional arrangements 
governing economic development. Institutions are perhaps best understood as ‘rules of 
the game’ that help to constrain and encourage behaviour. As Douglass North has shown, 
optimal institutions must be dynamic by adapting to change as well as helping to drive 
it.71 The colonial institutions imported into Australia from Britain had been adapted to 
meet local conditions. The economic, financial, labour and climatic crises of the 1890s, 
together with the unification of the colonies through Federation, necessitated further 
institutional adaption. British investors turned their back on many Australian companies 
following losses on speculative mining ventures, while the London boards of freestanding 
companies in Australia began to understand the growing ineffectiveness of management 
by remote control. Strikes by shearers, miners and maritime workers asserted the 
egalitarian aspirations of the Australian workforce, while colonial institutions offered no 
effective response to the drought. Federation provided the opportunity to design national 
solutions that would allow a more independent role for Australia in the global economy. 
Institutional change favoured the growth of national capabilities directed largely by 
the regulatory hand of government. The Lyne tariff schedule of 1908 initiated a long 
period of import protection designed to boost domestic manufacturing. Further major 
increases in protection occurred with the Greene Tariff of 1921 and the Scullin Tariff of 
1929–31. Many other adjustments were orchestrated by the Tariff Board, which was 
established in 1921 and remained influential into the second half of the century.72 Import 
quotas were also used in the 1950s. By the late 1960s the effective rate of protection for 
manufacturing (allowing for the impact of the tariffs on inputs as well as outputs) had 
reached 36 per cent.73 Attempts were also made to protect domestic industry from foreign 
competition through the Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906. Succour was 
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similarly provided to agriculture from the 1920s through marketing boards, price support 
schemes, and international commodity agreements. 
Labour markets and industrial relations became highly centralised and regulated. The 
industrial unrest of the 1890s fostered arbitration between employer and employee 
groups. The 1904 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act established the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to prevent and settle industrial 
disputes covering two or more states; by 1929 it presided over 59 per cent of wage 
changes.74 A range of regulatory and conciliation bodies continued to exist at the State 
level. 
The hand of government regulation was prominent in financial markets, particularly 
through the Commonwealth issue of currency from 1910, the publicly owned 
Commonwealth Bank in 1912, and the powers conferred on the Loan Council in 1927 to 
determine the volume of public sector borrowing. From World War 2 the Commonwealth 
Bank assumed the role of central banker and regulator of monetary policy; the central 
banking function was hived off to form the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1960. 
Government regulation of financial markets increased, particularly as a result of wartime 
controls in 1942 and two banking acts in 1945. As David Merrett has noted, ‘At the end 
of the war, the Australian privately-owned banking system was tightly regulated in almost 
every respect’.75 
Australians took a major leap forward in seeking to design institutions oriented 
towards the needs of national development. To say that these institutional arrangements 
built scale more than they did efficiency would be consistent with the story of factor 
accumulation over increased productivity. The combination of subsidised agriculture, 
tariffs, centralised wage fixing and regulated financial markets created a significant 
misallocation of resources in a high-cost, high-price economy. Besides the misallocation 
of resources through a heavily regulated environment, such policies became increasingly 
bureaucratic over time with a plethora of rules and enforcement bodies at different levels 
of government that made them difficult and costly to enforce. A.G. Kenwood’s analysis 
of Australian institutions has drawn attention, for example, to the existence by the 1920s 
of 10 federal and in excess of 50 State agricultural marketing authorities.76 
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While not the only reason for manufacturing’s expansion, tariffs sheltered domestic 
firms from overseas competitors long after the infant industry argument had expired. The 
OECD’s 1973 annual survey of the Australian economy attributed faltering economic 
performance to weak competitiveness brought on in part by protectionist policies. The 
Crawford Committee reached a similar conclusion six years later in support of reduced 
protection. Centralised wage agreements based primarily upon social justice were 
criticised for failing to align rewards with skills and thus discouraging human capital 
investment. Competition policy was criticised more for its absence, the 1906 Act having 
become a dead letter. During the inter-war downturn governments encouraged firms to 
cooperate to share costs and reduce oversupply in production, a pattern taken much 
further by the Department of War Organisation of Industry (1941–45), which forced 
rationalisation. The 1981 Australian Financial System Inquiry drew attention to 
distortions created by segmentation among different types of provider and the mismatch 
between official and market rates of interest. In addition, there was a confusing set of 
exchange controls, while competition from foreign banks was prohibited. 
A shift in institutional arrangements began to occur in response to these pressures, 
bringing a change from a regulated towards a deregulated environment. Governments 
were also conscious of similar moves in major economies such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Centralised wage determination was under pressure from the 1950s 
as actual wages pushed ahead of those centrally determined. However, the principal 
changes emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as it became clear that the Australian economy 
needed to become more competitive. Centralised wage policies were gradually 
abandoned: indexation for the cost of living was removed in 1981 by the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and by 1993 a half of salary and wage earners 
were covered by enterprise-based agreements at the individual workplace.77 Financial 
reforms relaxed exchange controls and the permissible activities of financial institutions, 
and attracted greater involvement by foreign lenders. Dismantling of the tariff regime 
began in the 1970s and continued through the next two decades, so that the effective rate 
of protection had fallen to around 5 per cent by 2000.78 Competition policy was 
revitalised from the 1960s, initially directed against inter-firm collusion under the 1965 
Trade Practices Act. Major changes occurred with 1974 legislation that established a 
Trade Practices Commission, concentrated on broad general guidelines rather than 
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individual cases, with powers that included consumer protection and substantial penalties. 
Subsequent legislation defined anti-competitive behaviour, initially by a dominance 
(market share) test and then by use of economic theory to predict the consequences of 
particular types of behaviour. The establishment of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission in 1995 was the culmination of these policies under a principal 
federal authority. 
Contemporary resilience or dependent fragility? 
This chapter began with the story of economic achievement in twentieth-century 
Australia that has enabled people, on average, to become much wealthier and have a far 
greater choice over how to spend their longer lives. Progress came in fits and starts, and 
not everyone shared equally in these advances. While the century began with a belated 
recovery from the crises of the 1890s, it ended on the crest of an extended period of 
prosperity that ran for a decade and a half from 1992 until the global financial crisis 
(GFC) of 2007–08. Australia not only performed better than most in the 1990s, it was less 
seriously affected by the subsequent economic and financial crisis. Such progress and 
then resilience might suggest that the achievements of the twentieth century have taken 
on a self-sustaining nature; that an optimal set of institutions had emerged iteratively to 
temper regulation with market incentives; that a balanced and receptive view of 
Australia’s role in the world economy had been achieved by casting off both dependency 
on Britain and a national fortress mentality; that the tyranny of distance had been tamed 
by modern communications and Asian industrialisation; that a modern national 
innovation system will sustain productivity improvements into the future; and finally that 
the angst of constrained industrialisation and reliance upon unpredictable resource 
industries had been dismissed as a falsehood. 
It may be possible to talk in terms of economic maturity in some of these respects, 
although the story of robust future proofing reveals some sensitive fault-lines. While 
productivity appears to have had an enhanced role in economic progress in the second 
half of the twentieth century, its growth has been irregular and most recently has begun to 
tail off once more.79 Recent reports on the innovation system that underpins productivity 
have identified some key problems. These include low investment in research compared 
with most OECD nations, particularly in business investment. Similarly, comparatively 
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low levels of public investment in education will restrict the vital contribution of human 
capital to innovation. It has also been suggested that weak communication and 
collaboration exists among key parts of the innovation system, especially between public 
bodies and industry.80 The most recent and comprehensive analysis of innovation, 
Venturous Australia, listed 72 recommendations.  
The tyranny of distance has been mitigated and Australia has engaged more 
independently with global society. Yet Australia remains geographically remote and there 
is no true substitute for face-to-face connection. Full engagement with recently 
industrialised and industrialising East Asia throws up sociocultural challenges as well as 
crystallising a dependency, for better or worse, on exporting resources and importing 
manufactures. Australia seeks to find its place in a plethora of regional trade blocs, none 
of which perceive Australia as core to its modus operandi. Australian firms continue to 
struggle to make an impact in their overseas ventures, as witnessed by Foster’s recent 
drawback of its American wine interests. 
At home Australia continues to espouse a fragmented form of federalism with the 
associated risks of a multitude of diverse, sometimes conflicting, official bodies. As 
economic institutions look to respond to future shifts in economic development, it is not 
clear whether policy reforms will be any speedier in their response than in previous eras. 
Such bureaucratic pluralism is symptomatic of a broader continuity of regionalist 
attitudes or State-based particularism, an outlook that stifles the development of a unified 
national economy and outlook. Socioeconomic challenges facing many developed nations 
are likely to operate on the Australian economy, particularly the need to respond to the 
effects of climate change, an ageing society, and the unfinished business of disadvantaged 
Indigenous communities. 
                                                          
80 Mapping Australian Science and Innovation (Canberra: Department of Education Science and Training, 2003), 
pp. 28, 33, 52; Venturous Australia: Building Strength in Innovation (Melbourne: Cutler & Company, 2008), p. 
6. 
